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After a jury-waived trial in the Central Division of the
Boston Municipal Court Department, the trial judge convicted the
defendant, David M. Agro, under G. L. c. 209A, § 7, of one count
of violating an abuse prevention order.

On appeal, Agro argues

that the trial judge abused her discretion by admitting the
Commonwealth's key evidence -- specifically, a screenshot that
the victim took of her Facebook "Notifications" page.

The

screenshot shows that a Facebook user named Monte Agro "liked" a
post to the victim written by a third party.

The third party's

post stated "Happy Birthday [victim]." The Commonwealth's theory
was that the defendant violated the restraining order's no
contact prohibition because by "liking" the third party's post,
the defendant's "like" was communicated to the victim in
accordance with Facebook's processes.

Agro contends that the

image of the Facebook "like" was not properly authenticated and
thus inadmissible.
Background.

We disagree and affirm.
Agro and the victim met in 2002 and were

married in 2009; they separated in 2014.

In May of 2015, a

Probate and Family Court judge issued a c. 209A abuse prevention
order against Agro after Agro had published a Facebook post, on
the victim's birthday, containing lurid and thinly veiled
threats of violence against the victim.

Approximately one year

later and six days before the expiration of the 209A order, the
victim looked at her Facebook notifications page on her cell
phone and saw that Facebook user Monte Agro had "liked" a
birthday message to the victim posted one day earlier, on the
victim's birthday.

The "like" was communicated on the victim's

"Notifications" page as follows:
your timeline."1

"Monte Agro likes a post on

The victim took a screenshot of the page and

The victim testified that the Facebook timeline is a Facebook
interface that shows a record of "posts" -- for example, "people
. . . post messages to you related to an event that's maybe
marked by Facebook," such as a birthday. With respect to
"liking," the victim stated:
1

"[W]hen someone sends a message to me and it . . .
say[s] . . . happy birthday, if people want to
reinforce or send the same message . . . instead of
kind of taking the time to, like, type it out again,
like is a way to say . . . I'm sending you the same
message. It's kind of a lazy man's way of reinforcing
something."
2

provided the image to the Boston Police Department.2

The

defendant was charged and thereafter convicted of violating the
abuse prevention order.
Discussion.

The defendant appeals.

The sole issue that Agro raises on appeal is

whether the Commonwealth sufficiently demonstrated that Agro was
actually responsible for the "like."3

The relevance and

admissibility of the Facebook screenshot of the "like" depended
upon the defendant having authored it.

See Commonwealth v.

Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 303, 308 (2019).

Both the Supreme

Judicial Court and this court have recently addressed the issue
of authentication of electronic communications.

See

Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 450-451 (2011); Meola, 95
Mass. App. Ct. at 310-315.

"The requirement of authentication

. . . as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims."

Purdy, 459 Mass. at

447, quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 901(a) (2011).

The trial judge,

Although the parties have not included a copy of the abuse
prevention order in the appendix, the victim read relevant
portions of the order into the record. Among other things, the
order prohibited Agro from "contact[ing]" the victim "in person,
by telephone, in writing, electronically, or otherwise either
directly or through someone else."
2

We note that Agro does not contend that in the circumstances
the "liking" of a Facebook post made by a third party cannot
constitute a violation of the no contact provisions.
3

3

acting as gatekeeper, determines whether the fact finder could
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered
evidence is what its proponent says it is.

See Purdy, 459 Mass.

at 447; Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 307 (explaining further that
authentication "represents a special aspect of relevancy"
[citation omitted]).

At trial, the defendant preserved his

objection to the screenshot's admissibility.

We review the

judge's authentication determination for abuse of discretion.
See Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 312; Commonwealth v. Connolly,
91 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 585 (2017).
In this case the Commonwealth did not present direct
evidence that the defendant authored the "like."

Nor did anyone

from Facebook testify as to what its business records showed
regarding the "Monte Agro" account.

"Evidence that the

defendant's name is written as the author of an . . . electronic
communication . . . is not sufficient alone to authenticate the
electronic communication as having been authored or sent by the
defendant."

Purdy, 459 Mass. at 450.

Purdy and Meola make

clear, however, that direct evidence is not required, and that
an electronic communication can be authenticated through
circumstantial evidence -- so-called "confirming circumstances"
-- that tend to show authorship by a particular person.
Purdy, 459 Mass. at 450; Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 311.
Circumstantial authenticating evidence "may include the
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See

'appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all
the circumstances'" (emphasis added).

Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct.

at 311 n.20, quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 901(b)(4) (2019).
Here, the victim's testimony based upon her lengthy
relationship with Agro furnished sufficient circumstantial
evidence for the judge to make the preliminary finding that the
Commonwealth had authenticated the Facebook "like," and thus to
admit the screenshot displaying it.

The victim had known Agro

for sixteen years, and had lived with and been married to him.
She testified that over the years she had communicated with Agro
on Facebook through the user account "Mont[e] Agro."

To the

victim's knowledge, Agro did not give the victim or anyone else
the password to his Facebook account, or enable others to access
the account.
This history of communication was sufficient to support a
determination of authenticity.

Just as past patterns of

telephone conversations may suffice to authenticate the identity
of a caller, see Purdy, 459 Mass. at 449, so too may the details
and history of communication with a certain Facebook user
suffice to authenticate a Facebook post as emanating from that
user.

Moreover, here there were additional, and more specific,

"confirming circumstances"; the event that led to the 209A order
was itself a Facebook post directed at the victim, which post

5

came from "Monte Agro," on the victim's birthday, one year
before.

These circumstances supported a reasonable inference

that Agro was also the author of the 2016 birthday "like"
emanating from the same account.

The victim had received no

contact whatsoever from Agro since the prior, threatening
birthday post.

See Commonwealth v. Loach, 46 Mass. App. Ct.

313, 316 (1999) (reasoning that timing of phone call was
confirming circumstance that supported authentication of phone
call).

In light of the context supplied by the victim's

testimony, as well as our deferential review of authentication
determinations, the judge did not err in admitting or relying
upon the Facebook "like."4
The prior course of dealing on Facebook between Agro and
the victim falls squarely within the broad range of confirming
circumstances that the judge may consider.

Agro attempts to

distinguish this case from Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, on the grounds
that the types of circumstantial evidence present there are
absent here.

In Purdy, which concerned the authentication of e-

mails, the circumstantial evidence supporting authentication

We note, as have prior courts, that the admission of the
screenshot displaying the "like" did not preclude Agro from
challenging the significance of the "like" or offering
alternative interpretations of its meaning. See Meola, 95 Mass.
App. Ct. at 313, citing United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125,
131 (2d Cir. 2014). Such arguments speak to the weight of the
evidence, not to its admissibility. Id.
4
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included the presence of the e-mails on the hard drive of the
defendant's computer (to which the defendant supplied the
necessary passwords), as well as the content of the e-mails
themselves.

Id. at 450-451.

But while the confirming

circumstances in this case are different from those in Purdy,
Purdy's holding does not limit the circumstantial evidence
courts may consider to the type present in that case.
Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 313.

See id.;

Indeed, in applying Purdy, the

Meola court relied upon different factors as sufficient to
authenticate a Facebook message with an attached video
recording.

95 Mass. App. Ct. at 314.

Here, the judge's

decision is consistent with Purdy and Meola; she relied upon
considerably more than "pure speculation," as Agro asserts, in
deciding to admit the screenshot.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin,
Massing & Englander, JJ.5),

Clerk
Entered:
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November 21, 2019.

The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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